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Reassessing Whitman’s 
hegelian affinities
Brian Brodhead Glaser
From the 1920s until the 1960s, as millie D. Jensen demonstrates in 
her 1964 essay, “Whitman and hegel: the Curious triplicate Process,” 
the quiet controversy about when Whitman first became aware of the 
philosopher spurred some advances into the question before its appeal 
seemed to disappear for a time.1 the facts are suggestive but do not 
allow a precise answer. two anthologies which came into print around 
the same time as the poem that would eventually be known as “song 
of myself,” frederic h. hedge’s Prose Writers of Germany (1847) and 
Joseph gostick’s German Literature (1854), were likely the main sources 
of Whitman’s exposure to the thought of hegel before 1879, but it is 
unclear when he read them. aside from his references to the philosopher 
in Democratic Vistas, there is nothing to suggest that during this period 
he sought more knowledge about him from the groups of american 
devotees which began to congregate in the second half of the century. 
among Whitman’s notes a short series of entries titled “the sunday 
evening lectures” discusses hegel and german-language philosophy, 
and, though it is generally agreed that these notes were written some 
time in the late 1860s, there is no firm evidence for a date. it is clear, 
however, that Whitman’s engagement with hegelian thought has two 
phases, the first coming between 1868 and 1871 when he was at work 
on Democratic Vistas and the second ten years later, when he met in st. 
louis with the hegelian William torrey harris.  
in addition to determining what Whitman learned about hegel and 
when, interpreting their relation also often involves recognizing that Whit-
man from the outset wanted to use hegel to frame and project the legacy 
of a poetics which was already a decade old. in this respect even Whit-
man’s own account of his hegelianism in these years ought to be read 
as a proleptic rather than retrospective description, since he was turning 
to hegel not for an explanation of the power of his poetry’s emergence 
but to explain its role in the social life and future of america. With the 
claim that “only hegel is fit for america,” Whitman pretty clearly asks 
the philosopher to stand in for himself when his poetics are pressed to 
a new level of involvement with politics.2 
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this connection between Whitman and hegel—politically focused—
i take to be the widely accepted one at the time of this writing. as Kath-
ryne V. lindberg pointed out in her powerful 1991 critique, “Whitman’s 
‘Convertible terms,’” the range of problems emerging from Whitman’s 
pretense to a widely representative selfhood have only come under scru-
tiny since theory has developed terms with which to attack the hegelian 
affinities Whitman claimed. lindberg puts it most concisely this way:
With successive self-presentations, from the representative “i” to a “me/myself” that 
encloses all the questions and answers of the philosophers and priests of the past, the 
Whitmanesque self loses its historical specificity in order to become transcendent or, 
like the hegelian world historical spirit, translatable—yet Whitman also insists on being 
“untranslatable.” Just so, mergers of chauvinism and egotism into what Quentin ander-
son has termed the “imperial self” [1971] were already apparent in the 1855 preface.3 
for the lines of contemporary theory most concerned to articulate the 
importance of differences, Whitman’s problematic self-conception can 
be traced to 1855 but only dismantled once he begins to make explicitly 
political and philosophical claims—as, in lindberg’s view, when he brings 
together in Democratic Vistas his ideal of the highest poetry as speaking 
for all with a rough notion of the dialectic in order to claim the impor-
tance of hegel for recognizing how americans must improve on their 
undemocratic inheritance of english literature. so lindberg’s critique 
of Whitman’s hegelianism culminates in a deconstruction of the poem 
which she understands his later prose to explicate:
the typical personality of Whitman’s poetic and critical corpus is wide, amorphous, if 
not aleatory. his american readers, so ready to reject history and politics in the name 
of an idealized individualism, have a special stake in appropriating or interpreting the 
self—the selves—he offers. “song of myself” alone is broad enough for most everyone 
to identify something of him or herself in the catalog of american types that Whitman 
calls “myself.” the resulting construct—variously “Whitman,” “i,” “me,” “the real me 
myself,” and even “you”—essentializes individualism and liberates the self from the very 
socioeconomic contingencies, the facticity, it seems to contain. (266)
it is powerful and prevalent theoretical criticism lindberg makes of 
Whitman’s “construct,” one stated in somewhat different terms by Philip 
fisher and allen grossman.
more recent work has continued to focus on the politically prob-
lematic dimensions of Whitman’s work when seen in a hegelian context, 
albeit with a less explicitly theoretical orientation. george B. handley 
puts it this way, in his 2007 New World Poetics:  
such yearning for a complete break from the Old World has paradoxically fostered a 
hegelian belief in the inevitable and utterly reliable directive of Western history and a 
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paradoxical lack of interest in social and environmental particulars. Of these three new 
World poets [Whitman, neruda, and Walcott] there is no doubt that Whitman is the 
most attracted to this kind of hegelian thinking.4 
Critics are not entirely in agreement about whether the difference-leveling 
impulse in Whitman’s later political writings invoking hegel signals a 
change in his thinking or betrays a consistent point of view, but alongside 
lindberg’s and handley’s studies we may place the findings of thomas 
f. haddox, who concludes in a 2004 essay that: 
Whitman’s growing interest in the philosophy of hegel, particularly evident in Democratic 
Vistas, suggests that he believes history in any meaningful sense to be at an end, that 
the democratic millennium is at hand, and that it will, despite all appearances to the 
contrary, progress unstoppably to its complete realization—a position all too amenable 
to conservatism and complacency.5 
as the contrast between handley’s and haddox’s positions makes 
clear, there is no pure consensus on what name should be given to the 
problematic dimensions of Whitman’s hegelianism, but it is clear that it 
involves, among other things, unreflecting conservatism, indifference to 
diversity, and a misunderstanding of what is powerful about history—all 
charges that threaten a more robustly democratic picture of Whitman 
that has its support in much of his work. 
handley’s treatment of the Whitman of Democratic Vistas as divided 
between an hegelian and a much more modern orientation may turn 
out to be the most useful to emerge from considerations of the question. 
But before we let the question fall silent for another spell, i would like 
to offer a further possibility. What drew Whitman to hegel was a sense 
of their affinity as thinkers on the subject of freedom. looking at the 
poem that would become “song of myself” and hegel’s Phänomenologie 
des Geistes (hereafter, Phenomenology of Spirit) in the context of ideas of 
freedom they were written out of and against, one can discern an im-
portant similarity between Whitman’s self-representation and hegel’s 
idea of Geist or spirit. 
stephen John mack has recently called the opening lines of “song 
of myself” “an elaboration of Whitman’s conception of natural, demo-
cratic selfhood.”6  he elaborates on this understanding by quoting at 
some length from the pragmatist george herbert mead, including this 
passage: 
no hard-and-fast line can be drawn between our own selves and the selves of others, 
since our own selves exist and enter as such into our experience only in so far as the 
selves of others exist and enter into our experience also. the individual possesses a self 
only in relation to the selves of the other members of his social group. (25)
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i think that mack is accurate in his description of Whitman’s under-
standing of the self and that he is right to locate its first articulation or 
expression in Whitman’s work where he does. i would add to mack’s 
argument that this understanding of the self is not only “pragmatic” but 
also hegelian, and, further, that this understanding of the self constituted 
a breakthrough for Whitman into a new understanding of freedom.
for Whitman in 1850, as one can tell from his political poems of 
the period, “Dough-face song” and “Blood money,”  the price of so-
ciality seemed to involve the reduction of the value of the individual to 
something expressed in hard currency. society is based on the demand 
for exchange, and exchange is the enemy of the ideal of freedom.7 such 
a notion of liberty we might call, following isaiah Berlin and others, a 
negative conception of freedom, the idea that freedom is always freedom 
from social constraints and controls. if he was inclined to believe this 
throughout the 1840s, the debates which led up to the Compromise of 
1850 only intensified Whitman’s commitment to this point of view—
indeed the autonomy of the individual had become so essential to his 
notion of freedom that his poetry could only relate to this ideally free 
self as either the satirical voice of a social authority who would under-
mine its independence or in an address to an individual who had been 
so traduced by the interests of the community as to be dumbstruck. By 
the early 1850s, the autonomous individual in Whitman’s poetry had 
become so idealized that he was unable to speak for himself.
this is the context in which i think we can recognize how signifi-
cantly Whitman’s notion of freedom changed over the four years between 
the publication of these poems and the promise of mutual belonging 
which opens his 1855 work. One mark of the continuity of his thought 
is the trace in the later work of his more combative assertions of free-
dom—in one paragraph of the preface he mentions both eponymous 
scourges of his free-soil poems, “bloodmoney” and “doughfaces.”8 Yet 
in this preface, as throughout the subsequent poem, Whitman’s motive 
is not to protest but to articulate his new ideal of poetry and its actual 
context in the United states. freedom has become a question not of 
autonomy but of having one’s chosen identity recognized by others. at 
the beginning of the work he says that american democracy requires “the 
practical acknowledgement of the citizens of one state by the citizens 
of all other states” and the “terrible significance of their elections” and 
that, for all of the discouraging compromise involved in such negotia-
tions, “these too are unrhymed poetry” which “awaits the gigantic and 
generous treatment worthy of it” (LG 1855, iii). in this new vision of 
american democracy, collectivity is not antithetical to freedom but the 
ground of it. 
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in order to show how the Phenomenology of Spirit anticipates Whit-
man’s changing conceptualization of freedom in the years leading to 
his achievement in 1855, i need as briefly as possible to set hegel’s 
breakthrough work in its own intellectual context. for this i rely on the 
summary of what is distinctive in hegel’s thought as has been most sym-
pathetically and comprehensively articulated by the philosopher Robert 
Pippin. in Modernism as a Philosophical Problem: On the Dissatisfactions of 
European High Culture (1991), Pippin sketches out how hegel’s thought 
is original for its solution to the problematic question of freedom for 
enlightenment thinkers:
let us assume that early modern philosophers understood modern liberation and a quest 
for independence as freedom from religious and traditional authority and a new, hard-
headed allegiance to “nature” as an ultimate standard, whether understood empirically 
or rationally, that Kant effectively criticized such appeals to nature and reinterpreted 
the true enlightenment as the human subject’s knowledge of its own self-legislating 
activity, and that hegel showed that the form of such contributions by the subject could 
not be determined by a transcendental analysis, but required some sort of a continuous 
historical narrative.9 
a quite similar picture emerges in Charles taylor’s Hegel (1975) and a 
number of recent studies of the concept of freedom in hegel’s thought, 
including Paul franco’s Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom (1999) and alan 
Patten’s Hegel’s Idea of Freedom (1999). as the relation is generally read, 
hegel asserted against Kant that no matter how distinct from divine 
revelation and instinct the subject’s self-knowledge might be, a subject 
could never become substantial enough to understand the freedom 
he creates for himself without some account of his past. this response 
to Kant is taken to be the intellectual center of hegel’s so-called Jena 
period, an era named for the city and university where he wrote The 
Phenomenology of Spirit in 1806 and 1807. 
as Pippin presents the issue which distinguishes Kant from hegel 
and creates the problematic idea of freedom for the post-enlightenment 
tradition, “the great, single modernity problem in the german tradition, 
is ‘autonomy’” (12). for Kant, freedom involves the discovery that the 
laws which establish one’s freedom emerge from one’s knowledge of 
one’s own being, as separate from both the natural world and society. 
the principle by which one comes to recognize these laws is called 
reason. Because of Kant’s re-definition for philosophy of the nature of 
freedom, Pippin writes:
the appropriate question at issue (asked many, many times after Kant) becomes whether 
such a subject can be so radically independent or self-determining, and especially whether 
its results can be said to apply universally to any agent attempting such critical freedom, 
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all because the results are what such an agent “would himself determine.” (14)
hegel’s notion of spirit arises from his attempt to answer this ques-
tion. for as The Phenomenology of Spirit presents the issue, history is 
meaningful to philosophy as the process by which human conscious-
ness has graduated to more and more powerful understandings of its 
freedom—as its awareness broadens, it evolves from mere understanding 
to self-consciousness to reason, at each point progressing in its develop-
ment by turning to think its own past from its newest perspective. from 
hegel’s point of view, what is substantially new in his own philosophy 
begins when the mind, from the perspective of reason, must turn to tell 
the story of its origin. for then it comes to find that self-definition by 
rational introspection cannot explain all that had been hoped. 
in the Phenomenology of Spirit, reason first recognizes the limits of its 
own capacity to authorize the laws in relation to which the self is free at 
the very end of the fifth chapter, in a subsection entitled “gesetzprüfende 
Vernunft” [“Reason as testing laws”].10 in the passage immediately 
before this, hegel has argued that reason by itself cannot give positive 
content to laws, and so its capacity to legislate must be confined to how 
it can validate them. to put such a process in motion he tests this idea 
as an example: “es ist die frage, soll es an und für sich gesetz sein, daß 
eigentum sei” (PG, 279) [“Ought it to be an absolute law that there 
should be property?” (PS, 257)]. Reason is by definition obliged to an-
swer this question in absolute terms, hegel notes first, because laws are 
for it not a question of utility for other ends but rational necessity. its 
procedure for testing such a law then can only be to ask whether there 
is an inherent contradiction in the concept of property as a law or right. 
and he claims simply that there is nothing in the concept of property 
which contradicts itself. however, he notes, this would also be the case 
with making property illegal. 
to come down on one side or the other, hegel then asks reason to 
consider the practical possibility of banning private property by allowing 
the individual to possess only those things which are deemed necessary. 
But, hegel argues, this regulation is antithetical to the nature of the 
individual, who will experience his own claim on resources to have a 
priority which they do not have from a more distant perspective. Yet the 
only alternative way of outlawing property is to regulate the distribution 
of goods to the individual based on need, which involves no universal 
standard for defining what counts as need and so leaves no stable way 
to arbitrate inevitable conflict.  however logically sound the prohibition, 
there can be no practical way of prohibiting private property that does 
not end up requiring arbitrary solutions to its own lived contradictions. 
therefore, hegel argues, extending the range of considerations from 
what he calls the formal issue of logical contradiction to the way such a 
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law would be “in momente aufgelöst” [“resolved into its moments”] in 
social life reveals that reason may be able to determine the legitimacy of 
at least some laws, at least negatively (PG, 279; PS, 258).
But there is a catch to extending the claim of reason this way. for if 
we look at how the legal right of private property would resolve into its 
moments in social life, it also turns out to be self-contradictory. hegel’s 
argument on this point could be stronger, in part, as alan Patten points 
out, because he is ultimately sympathetic to a view of property as essen-
tial to an individual’s development, an argument made in The Philosophy 
of Right. But his claim at this point goes far enough to substantiate his 
critique of reason as a tester of laws—he states that while the condition 
of the right of ownership is social recognition as an individual, ownership 
itself is a re-definition of the object on asocial terms.11 Vulnerable as this 
argument is rhetorically, the point for hegel is that it demonstrates a 
logical contradiction which appears at the heart of the idea of property 
only once the concept must be viewed in social or practical terms. his 
interest is not to resolve the question but to show why determining the 
legality of property cannot simply be left to reason as a process of logi-
cal deduction:
eigentum widerspricht sich daher nach allen seiten ebensosehr als nichteigentum; jedes 
hat diese beiden entgegengesetzten, sich widersprechenden momente der einzelheit und 
allgemeinheit an ihm.—aber jede dieser Bestimmtheiten einfach vorgestellt, als eigen-
tum oder nichteigentum, ohne weitere entwicklung, ist eine so einfach als die andere, 
d. h. sich nicht widersprechend.—Der maßstab des gesetzes, den die Vernunft an ihr 
selbst hat, paßt daher allem gleich gut, und ist hiermit in der tat kein maßstab. (PG, 280)
Consequently, property is just as much an all-round contradiction as non-property; each 
contains within it these two opposed, self-contradictory moments of individuality and 
universality. But each of these determinatenesses when thought of as simple, as property 
or non-property, without explicating them further, is as simple as the other, i.e. is not 
self-contradictory. the criterion of law which Reason possesses within itself fits every 
case equally well, and is thus in fact no criterion at all. (PS, 259)
Deciding whether laws are legitimate must not be a question of deter-
mining whether they are inherently self-contradictory, because it is the 
nature of laws in modern life to respond to the contradictory pressures 
of collectivity and individuality. and so to a very significant extent rea-
son is not capable of giving coherent definition to freedom or its limits 
in social life.
But how then to assess the validity of laws? and what is freedom 
if it is not autonomy, the capacity to derive one’s standards of behavior 
via introspection? these are the questions that lead hegel to insist on 
philosophy as a vehicle of spirit rather than reason. he claims that a 
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purely negative definition of freedom, an exclusive focus on autonomy, 
involves a misunderstanding of what it means to be an individual: “das 
Prüfen der gesetze, das Bewegen des Unbewegbaren und den frevel des 
Wissens bedeutet, der sich von den absoluten gesetzen frei räsonniert 
und sie für eine ihm fremde Willkür nimmit” (PG, 281) [“testing the 
laws, moving the immovable, means the insolence of a knowledge which 
argues itself into a freedom from absolute laws, treating them as an alien 
caprice” (PS, 260)]. shortly beforehand, of course, he has demonstrated 
that it is possible for us to adopt a perspective in which any law seems 
self-contradictory and so not valid. But at our most thoughtful, he says, 
we do not know ourselves as an alienated, logic-chopping subject—we 
participate in what he calls the “sittliche substanz” [“ethical substance”] 
of a community, through which we have an immediate understanding 
of the difference between right and wrong (PG, 280; PS, 259). the 
question of what should or should not be an individual right has to do 
not with legal justification or logical consistency but with the way one’s 
ethical sense has been shaped by communal life. laws are simply one 
expression of ethical substance, and so have a special force for their 
community, a force which is not subject to dialectical tensions with the 
principle of individuality:
sie sind. Wenn ich nach ihrer entstehung frage, und sie auf den Punkt ihres Ursprungs 
einenge, so bin ich darüber hinausgegangen; denn ich bin nunmehr das allgemeine, sie 
aber das Bedingte und Beschränkte. Wenn sie sich meiner einsicht legitimieren sollen, 
so habe ich schon ihr unwankendes ansichsein bewegt und betrachte sie als etwas, das 
veilleicht wahr, veilleicht auch nicht wahr für mich sei. Die sittliche gesinnung besteht 
eben darin, unverrückt in dem fest zu beharren, was das Rechte ist, und sich alles Be-
wegens, Rüttelns und Zurückführens desselben zu enthalten. (PG, 283)
[laws] are. if i inquire after their origin and confine them to the point where they arose, 
then i have transcended them; for now it is i who am the universal, and they are the 
conditioned and limited. if they are supposed to be validated by my insight, then i have 
already denied their unshakeable, intrinsic being, and regard them as something which, 
for me, is perhaps true, but also is perhaps not true. ethical disposition consists just in 
sticking steadfastly to what is right, and abstaining from all attempts to move or shake 
it, or derive it. (PS, 261-262)
the insight in this passage which hegel chooses to carry forward in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit is not that the individual ought not question the 
authority of laws but that knowing what is right for the individual is not 
ultimately a question of laws at all. the point of calling laws unshakeable 
is not that they do not change but that the reason of their creation and 
their possible amendment cannot be found solely through the insight 
of the individual but in the trans-subjective social power by which they 
first of all are. 
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situated in the final paragraph of the chapter on reason, just be-
fore his shift to the concept he took to be his essential contribution to 
philosophy, hegel’s example of what is involved in accepting such a 
view of rightness puts the social issue of freedom in its starkest terms. 
hegel’s argument at this point is involved with the question of the so-
cial meaningfulness of one person’s freedom, and it turns on the issue 
of how to negotiate the universal right of property with the individual’s 
demand not to be constrained by alien laws. the question he asks is: 
how might one justify not returning what another has good legal claim 
on as his property?
es wird ein Depositum bei mir gemacht, es ist das eigentum eines andern, und ich 
anerkenne es, weil es so ist, und erhalte mich unwankende in diesem Verhältnisse. Be-
halte ich für mich das Depositum, so begehe ich nach dem Prinzipe meines Prüfens, 
der tautologie, ganz und gar keinen Widerspruch; denn alsdann sehe ich es nich mehr 
für das eigentum eines andern an; etwas behalten, das ich nicht für das eigentum 
eines andern ansehe, ist vollkommen konsequent. Die Änderung der ansicht ist kein 
Widerspruch, denn es ist nicht um sie als ansicht, sodern um den gegenstand und 
inhalt zu tun, der sich nicht widersprechen soll. so sehr ich—wie ich tue, wenn ich 
etwas wegschenke—die ansicht, daß etwas mein eigentum ist, in die ansicht, daß es 
das eigentum eines andern ist, verändern kann, ohne dadurch eines Widerspruches 
schuldig zu werden, ebensosehr kann ich den umgekehrten Weg gehen.—nicht darum 
also, weil ich etwas sich nicht widersprechende finde, ist es Recht; sondern weil es das 
Rechte ist, ist es Recht. (PG, 283)
suppose something has been entrusted to me; it is the property of someone else and i 
acknowledge this because it is so, and i keep myself unfalteringly in this relationship. if i 
should keep for myself what is entrusted to me, then according to the principle i follow 
in testing laws, which is a tautology, i am not in the least guilty of contradiction; for 
then i no longer look upon it as the property of someone else: to hold on to something 
which i do not regard as belonging to someone else is perfectly consistent. alteration 
of the point of view is not contradiction; for what we are concerned with is not the point 
of view, but the object and content, which ought not to be self-contradictory. Just as 
i can—as i do when i give something away—alter the view that it is my property into 
the view that it belongs to someone else, without becoming guilty of contradiction, so 
i can equally pursue the reverse course. it is not, therefore, because i find something 
is not self-contradictory that it is right; on the contrary, it is right because it is what is 
right. (PS, 262)
nothing in reason can allow us to distinguish our objection to a law 
out of conviction from our objection on the grounds of a false principle 
because laws are both defensible and vulnerable on the question of self-
contradiction, depending on the perspective one adopts. so, in hegel’s 
view, one should return what belongs to someone else because one is 
a member of a community for which private property is a right and so 
is protected not only by law but by each individual’s sense of commit-
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ment to a point of view from which that legal right can be consistently 
recognized.
from this discussion, it is not too hard to see why in hegel’s work 
the first of the three phases of the development of spirit in social life is 
the one in which self-explanations have to do not with principles but with 
identities, a domain hegel calls “die sittliche Welt” [“the ethical world”] 
(PG, 288; PS, 267). spirit is an ethical substance insofar as the individual 
selves which constitute it both acknowledge their social construction 
and take up possession of identities in the social nexus that defines 
these identities. so in an intellectual world illuminated by this concept, 
in contrast with a realm guided by the ideals of rational introspection, 
freedom is to be understood not as autonomy from external laws but 
rather as the capacity to inhabit positions of participation in social life:
Die substanz und das allgemeine, sichselbstgleiche, bleibende Wesen,—ist er der unver-
rückte und unaufgelöste grund und ausgangspunkt des tuns aller und ihr Zweck und 
Ziel, als das gedachte ansich aller selbstbewußtsein.—Diese substanz ist ebenso das 
allgemeine Werk, das sich durch das tun aller und jeder als ihre einheit und gleichheit 
erzeugt, denn sie ist das fürsichsein, das selbst, das tun. (PG, 285)
spirit, being the substance and the universal, self-identical, and abiding essence, is the 
unmoved solid ground and starting-point for the action of all, and it is their purpose 
and goal, the in-itself of every self-consciousness expressed in thought. this substance 
is equally the universal work produced by the action of all and each as their unity and 
identity, for it is the being-for-self, the self, action. (PS, 264)
Confusing as the terminological distinctions between being-in-itself 
and being-for-itself may seem at a first reading, the two aspects of the 
substance of spirit—one as the ground of meaningful selfhood, and 
the other as the product of the work done by all who emerge from this 
ground—are a crucial dyad, because of the way hegel uses them to ex-
plain the justification of individual actions in the domain of spirit. for 
in hegel’s analysis, an ethics informed by the notion of spirit can offer a 
much more ample notion of human freedom than one based on reason 
precisely because one’s claims on rights are circumscribed not by the 
Kantian criterion of universal non-contradiction but by a sympathetic 
societal acknowledgement of the importance of self-interest:
als die substanz ist der geist die unwankende gerechte sichselbstgleichheit; aber als 
fürsichsein ist sie das aufgelöste, das sich aufopfernde gütige Wesen, an dem jeder sein 
eigenes Werk vollbringt, das allgemeine sein zerreißt und sich seinen teil davon nimmt. 
Diese auflösung und Vereinzelung des Wesens ist eben das moment des tuns und selbsts 
aller; es ist die Bewegung und seele der substanz und das bewirkte allgemeine Wesen. 
gerade darin, daß sie das im selbst aufgelöste sein ist, ist sie nicht das tote Wesen, 
sondern wirklich und lebendig. (PG, 285)
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as substance, spirit is unshaken righteous self-identity; but as being-for-self it is a frag-
mented being, self-sacrificing and benevolent, in which each accomplishes his own work, 
rends asunder the universal being, and takes from it his own share. this resolving of the 
essence into individuals is precisely the moment of the action and the self of all; it is the 
movement and soul of substance and the resultant universal being. Just because it is a 
being that is resolved in the self, it is not a dead essence, but is actual and alive. (PS, 264)
self-interest, from such a perspective, is not what is to be expunged via 
rational introspection but rather the abstract matter out of which the 
meaningfulness of one’s own selfhood can ultimately be composed.
Under the aspect of the hegelian notion of spirit, then, freedom 
cannot be defined merely in negative terms. individual freedoms are 
not achieved by extricating oneself from societal constraints, but instead 
by moving through alienation from available forms of selfhood into an 
identification with them. laws are not checked against an independent 
source of rationality; they are felt as one form of delineation of the kind of 
person one finds oneself able to be. and the individual self is understood 
not as a fundamentally pre-social autonomous core but as a space into 
which one may, through identifications, draw more and more personal 
modes of being. 
this is not yet a fully dialectical view of self-consciousness—but it 
is the distinctly post-Kantian understanding of the nature of the self that 
makes such a dialectic possible. staying with Whitman as the inaugura-
tor of such a tradition in american literature involves focusing on what 
is in retrospect perhaps the most problematic link between Whitman’s 
notion of mutual belonging and hegel’s conception of spirit. for the 
spot at which this connection seems most strongly stated in the begin-
ning of the sixth chapter of the Phenomenology comes where hegel, like 
Whitman, defines the furthest reaches of spirit in the starkest terms of 
closure, the Volk: “Der geist ist das sittliche leben eines Volks, insofern 
der die unmittelbare Wahrheit ist,—das individum, as eine Welt ist” (PG, 
286) [“spirit is the ethical life of a nation in so far as it is the immediate 
truth—the individual that is a world” (PS, 265)]. needing, as Whitman 
did, to define the community inside of which one’s identifications would 
be meaningful, hegel makes the same conclusion as the poet: the largest 
shape which spiritual selfhood can take is the body of a community. One 
may escape the pressure to define a community’s laws in terms of an 
autonomous rationality, but one cannot define an actual ethical sphere 
based on identifications without some horizon of exclusion.   
i think it is important to note in retrospect that what drew both 
hegel and Whitman to conceive of the construction of the self in terms 
of a community was that it offered them the largest gathering of selves 
among which a dialectical commerce could be imagined. and it is with 
this concern for amplitude that Whitman’s own version of ethical sub-
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stance shows a democratic dimension that hegel can perhaps help us to 
identify. as an instance of what an hegelian ethics of identification gives 
to “song of myself,” return to these lines from near the end of the poem: 
listener up there! here you . . . . what have you to confide to me?
look in my face while i snuff the sidle of evening, 
talk honestly, for no one else hears you, and i stay only a minute longer.
Do i contradict myself?
Very well then . . . . i contradict myself;
i am large . . . . i contain multitudes. (LG 1855, 55)
even as he invites the national individual—his poetry’s “you”—to share in 
every atom of his being he insists that he is also just about to be entirely 
somewhere else. and then he offers this contradictory self-staging as 
evidence of his capacity to enfold the “you” all the more abundantly. it 
is in this way that it seems to me illuminating to see Whitman’s attempt 
to absorb tensions between the individual and the collective as an effort 
to make actual the voice of what hegel calls the “ethical substance” by 
which personal freedoms become meaningful (PS, 262). freedom for 
both writers has to do not with articulating for oneself the terms on which 
one participates in society but rather with recognizing that responding to 
the address to subjects, the call to the “you,” is a condition for the capac-
ity to confide or give to another what has not yet been reached by such a 
call. indeed, as Whitman expresses the process, a further consequence of 
this openness is to be able to identify with the way this other maintains 
the dynamism of selfhood by seeking out new modes of being which 
its interconnected structure allows it to contain. Reading Whitman’s 
breakthrough on hegelian terms, we might say that the self ’s invitation 
to mutual belonging is a signal that the self is not ultimately alienated 
from its cultural ground but rather can only be truly free insofar as it 
might be or become a shareable way of living.
in this way i think hegel helps to illuminate one of the insights that 
was radically new for Whitman in his 1855 poem. and looking at such 
a relation also allows us to see in turn how living with Kant’s notion 
of autonomy pressed hegel to this idea—for without some notion of 
ethical substance there can be contentious legislative processes but no 
stable way of assessing any law’s relative claim to being just. Perhaps one 
need not take the case for the similarity in the two men’s work beyond 
noticing that a good deal of Whitman’s frustration as a political poet in 
the 1850s had to do with the fact that his ideal of freedom as absolute 
self-determination gave him a compelling position from which to write 
against the fugitive slave act but could also be appropriated by henry 
Clay to claim that such an argument expressed a merely northern interest. 
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Unlike Whittier, Whitman did not persist in writing protest poems—
but he did stay with the idea of freedom that resisting the Compromise 
of 1850 had clarified for him until this idea developed into what was 
for his poetry, and perhaps for the intellectual life of nineteenth-century 
america, a deep consequence. for Whitman’s move towards celebrating 
the transpersonal possession of a possible self is, as Robert Pippin puts 
it in a slightly different context, the moment at which modernity might 
be said to answer the question of liberty with which it has defined itself. 
as hegel explains the shift from freedom as autonomy to freedom as a 
transpersonal form of selfhood, the ultimate value of the individual has 
not been compromised at all—the idea has become rather that achieving 
the fullest recognition of the individual is not a question of justification 
and its negative dimension, the refusal to participate in communal life, 
but of self-expression and the capacity to make such expression avail-
able to others. 
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